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Texto de referencia: Nordhaus y el informe del IPCC: estado de emergencia intelectual y climática (1) y Nordhaus y el informe del IPCC: estado de emergencia intelectual y climática (2)

1. Mark Skousen (1997) – The Perseverance of Paul Samuelson’s Economics – Journal of Economic Perspectives 11:137–15 – https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.11.2.137
   “Over the years, Samuelson has gradually given more space in his textbook to non-Keynesian schools. By the eighth edition (1970), Milton Friedman was cited a half dozen times. In the ninth edition (1973), he recommended Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom as a «rigorously logical, careful, often persuasive elucidation of an important point of view» (9:848). The ninth edition also adds a significant chapter, «Winds of Change: Evolution of Economic Doctrines,» which summarizes the spectrum of warring schools, including institutionalists (Veblen and Galbraith), the New Left and radical economics.”
2. Dana Nuccitelli – Lukewarmerism, a.k.a. Ignoring Inconvenient Evidence – Skeptical Science, 11/02/2013 – http://www.skepticalscience.com/lukewarmerism-aka-ignoring-inconvenient-evidence.html
   «Despite his lack of climate expertise, one of the most prominent self-proclaimed «lukewarmers» featured in the media is Matt Ridley, a science writer, businessman, and poor risk manager. In its September 2012 edition, WIRED magazine published an article in which Ridley wrongly argued that virtually every environmental concern over the past half century has been overblown, and therefore concern about climate change must also be overblown. Skeptical Science debunked that article, and that debunking was quoted in the November 2012 edition of WIRED, which also featured excerpts from some other letters and articles both praising and criticizing Ridley’s piece.»
3. Dana Nuccitelli – Lukewarmers – the third stage of climate denial, gambling on snake eyes – Skeptical Science, 13/05/2015 – http://www.skepticalscience.com/lukewarmers-third-stage-of-climate-denial.html
   “It’s the hottest trend in climate denial. Long gone are the days when people can publicly deny that the planet is warming or that humans are responsible without facing widespread mockery. Those who oppose taking serious action to curb global warming have mostly shifted to Stage 3 in the 5 stages of climate denial. Stage 1: Deny the problem exists Stage 2: Deny we’re the cause Stage 3: Deny it’s a problem Stage 4: Deny we can solve it Stage 5: It’s too late. Each of the 5 stages shares one main characteristic – all can be used to argue against efforts and policies to slow global warming. If the planet isn’t warming, or if we’re not causing it, or if it’s not a problem, or if we can’t solve it, or if it’s too late, in each case there’s no reason to implement climate policies.”
4. Adrian Cho – Nobel Prize for the economics of innovation and climate change stirs controversy – Science News, 08/10/2018 – https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/roles-ideas-and-climate-growth-earn-duo-economics-nobel-prize
   “Instead of spurring governments to take action against climate change, Nordhaus’s approach has been used to justify putting it off, Steinberger argues. «His kind of analysis has been used to delay, delay, delay,» she says. In 1992 Nordhaus published an analysis in which he identified 3°C as the optimum temperature increase for the growth of capital, although he has since modified that position.”
5. Robert C. Schmidt and Jobst Heitzig (2013) – Carbon leakage: Grandfathering as an incentive device to avert firm relocation – Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 10.1016/j.jeem.2013.12.004 – Department of Economics, Humboldt University; Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research
   “Emission allowances are sometimes distributed for free in an early phase of a cap-and-trade scheme to reduce adverse effects on the profitability of firms. This paper investigates whether grandfathering can also be used to avert the relocation of firms to countries with lower carbon prices. We show that under certain conditions, relocation can be averted in the long run, even if the grandfathering scheme is phased out over time and immediate relocation is profitable in its absence. This requires that the permit price triggers sufficient investments into low-carbon technologies or abatement capital that create a lock-in effect which makes relocation unprofitable.»
6. Reiner Kümmel (2011) – The Second Law of Economics: Energy, Entropy, and the Origins of Wealth – Springer – Institute for Theoretical Physics and Astrophysics, University of Würzburg – ISBN-13: 978-1461429197 – 316 Págs. – http://www.aspo2012.at/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/K%C3%BCmmel_aspo2012.pdf
   “These economists assumed that global warming affects only agriculture, which contributed less than 3% to the GDP of the USA in 1992. (The 2009 contribution of US agriculture to GDP was a mere 1.2% of total GDP.) The contribution of agriculture in other industrialized countries has been comparably low (see Table 4.1). Therefore, even a drastic decline of agricultural production should only result in small losses of welfare.”
7. Leslie Roberts (1991) – Academy Panel Split on Greenhouse Adaptation – Science 253:1206 doi:10.1126/science.253.5025.1206
   “Nordhaus: ‘Ninety percent of U.S. economic activity has no interaction with the ecological changes Lubchenco is concerned about. Agriculture, the part of the economy that is sensitive to climate change, accounts for just 3% of national output. That means there is no way to get a very large effect on the U.S. economy. It is hard to say it is the nation’s number one problem.’. ”
8. Detlef P. van Vuuren et al (2011) – How well do integrated assessment models simulate climate change? – Climatic Change 104:255-285 doi:10.1007/s10584-009-9764-2 – Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency – http://www.climate.unibe.ch/~plattner/papers/vanvuuren09cc_online_first.pdf – 9 autores
   «Our results show that in most cases the outcomes of IAMs are within the range of the outcomes of complex models, but differences are large enough to matter for policy advice. There are areas where IAMs would benefit from improvements (e.g. climate sensitivity, inertia in climate response, carbon cycle feedbacks). In some cases, additional climate model experiments are needed to be able to tune some of these improvements. This will require better communication between the IAM and ESM development communities.»
9. Gerard H. Roe and Marcia B. Baker (2007) – Why Is Climate Sensitivity So Unpredictable? – Science 318:629-632 doi:10.1126/science.1144735 – 26/10/2007 – Department of Earth and Space Sciences, University of Washington – http://climatechange.pbworks.com/f/Why+is+climate+sensitivity+so+unpredictable+G.H.Roe+et+al+Science+2007.H.Roe+et+al+Science+2007.pdf
   “We are constrained by the inevitable: the more likely a large warming is for a given forcing (i.e., the greater the positive feedbacks), the greater the uncertainty will be in the magnitude of that warming.”
10. Martin L. Weitzman (2009) – On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change – The Review of Economics and Statistics 91:1-19 doi:10.1162/rest.91.1.1 – 28/01/2009 – Department of Economics, Harvard University – http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/rest.91.1.1
    “The contribution of this paper is to phrase exactly and to present rigorously a basic theoretical principle that holds under positive relative risk aversion and potentially unlimited exposure. In principle, what might be called the catastrophe insurance aspect of such a fat-tailed unlimited-exposure situation, which can never be fully learned away, can dominate the social-discounting aspect, the pure-risk aspect, and the consumption-smoothing aspect. Even if this principle in and of itself does not provide an easy answer to questions about how much catastrophe insurance to buy (or even an easy answer in practical terms to the question of what exactly is catastrophe insurance buying for climate change or other applications), I believe it still might provide a useful way of framing the economic analysis of catastrophes.”
11. Martin L. Weitzman (2011) – Fat-Tailed uncertainty in the economics of catastrophic climate change – Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5:275-292 doi:10.1093/reep/rer006 – 21/06/2011 – Department of Economics, Harvard University – https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/weitzman/files/fattaileduncertaintyeconomics.pdf
    “In Weitzman (2009a), I presented a formal argument within a specific mathematical structure, but this formal argument could have been embedded in alternative mathematical structures—with the same basic message. The particular formal argument I presented was in the form of what I called a ‘‘dismal theorem’’ (DT). In this particular formalization, the limiting expected stochastic discount factor is infinite (or, what I take to be equivalent for purposes here, the limiting WTP to avoid fat-tailed disasters constitutes all of output). ”
12. Frank Ackerman et al (2010) – Fat tails, exponents, extreme uncertainty: Simulating catastrophe in DICE – Ecological Economics 69:1657–1665 doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.03.013 – Stockholm Environment Institute – 3 autores
    “The bad news is that the optimal policy recommended by a standard IAM such as DICE is completely dependent on the choice of key, uncertain parameters. The good news is that there is no reason to believe that sound economics, or even the choice of established, orthodox models, creates any grounds for belittling the urgency of the climate crisis. ”
13. Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling (2004) – Priceless: on knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing – The New Press New York – Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University
    «The case against health, safety, and environmental protection rests on a handful of widely circulated stories, told by just a handful of storytellers … [This autores] are not exactly household names. But they have had an influence on attitudes toward protective regulation that is out of all proportion to their name recognition and their size as a group. These analysts and their institutional homes – places like the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, the Mercatus Center, the Cato Institute and the Competitive Enterprise Institute – are responsible for generating the critical peices of ‘antiregulatory’ data and analysis, upon which the second Bush administration bases its ardently pro-industry stance.»
14. Franck Ackerman and Elisabeth A. Stanton (2011) – Climate Risks and Carbon Prices: Revising the Social Cost of Carbon – Economics for Equity and the Environment Network doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2012-10 – 23/09/2011 – Stockholm Environment Institute – U.S. Center, Somerville – http://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate-mitigation-adaptation/Economics_of_climate_policy/sei-climate-risks-carbon-prices-2011-full.pdf
    «This result can be generalized to other environmental issues: when there is a credible risk that the marginal damage curve for an externality turns vertical at some point (representing discontinuous, extremely large damages), then the shadow price of the externality, such as the SCC, becomes so large that cost-benefit analysis turns into cost-effectiveness analysis of the least-cost strategy for staying safely below the threshold.»
15. Noah Kaufman (2011) – The bias of integrated assessment models that ignore climate catastrophes – Climatic Change 110:575-595 doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0140-7 – 02/07/2011 – Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin – http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/WCERE/2010/424/Bias_of_IAMs.pdf
    «Climate scientists currently predict there is a small but real possibility that climate change will lead to civilization threatening catastrophic events. Martin Weitzman has used this evidence along with his controversial “Dismal Theorem” to argue that integrated assessment models of climate change cannot be used to determine an optimal price for carbon dioxide. In this paper, I provide additional support for Weitzman’s conclusions by running numerical simulations to estimate risk premiums toward climate catastrophes. Compared to the assumptions found in most integrated assessment models, I incorporate into the model a more realistic range of uncertainty for both climate catastrophes and societal risk aversion. The resulting range of risk premiums indicates that the conclusions drawn from integrated assessment models that do not incorporate the potential for climate catastrophes are too imprecise to support any particular policy recommendation. The analysis of this paper is more straightforward and less technical than Weitzman’s, and therefore the conclusions should be accessible to a wider audience. «
16. Robert S. Pindyck (2011) – Fat Tails, Thin Tails, and Climate Change Policy – Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5:258-274 doi:10.1093/reep/rer005 – 21/06/2011 – Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    “Of course, a fat-tailed distribution for temperature will have … fat tails, making the probability of an extreme outcome larger than it would be under a thin-tailed distribution (Table 1, Figure 1b).Weitzman (2010, 2011) suggests that this in turn justifies stringent abatement as an ‘‘insurance policy’’ against an extreme outcome. If our only concern is with avoiding an extreme outcome, then a fat-tailed distribution makes such an insurance policy much easier to justify. But as with any insurance policy, what matters for climate insurance is the cost of the insurance (in this case the cost of abatement) and its expected benefit, in terms of how it will shift the distribution for possible outcomes. ”
17. Antony Millner (2011) – On welfare frameworks and catastrophic climate risks – Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 65:310–325 doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2012.09.006 – 01/03/2013 – Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science – http://are.berkeley.edu/documents/seminar/catastrophes.pdf
    “This result is valuable, but to obtain the essential economic insights of the dismal theorem, one needs far less mathematical machinery than Weitzman employs: Any positive probability of zero consumption, no matter how small, implies welfare diverges for utility functions with a coefficient of relative risk aversion greater than or equal to one.12 … if we allow for consumption approaching zero at finite (but very high) temperature, as must be the case, and are not able to make transfers to the future with certainty (as seems plausible), then existing criticisms of the dismal theorem fail to persuade.”
18. Robert H. Sokolow (2011) – High-consequence outcomes and internal disagreements: tell us more, please – Climatic Change 108:775-790 doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0187-5 – Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Princeton University
    “Martin Weitzman has shown that the problem of relative weights for mean vs. extreme outcomes can be formulated mathematically using a damage function that sums over outcomes, and that whether the mean or the extreme dominates (whether the sum converges) depends on currently unknowable details of the probability distribution for the worst outcomes. [Weitzman 2009] Accordingly, the policy-making community needs information about both probable and improbable outcomes. One can imagine that, for many policymakers, the priority given to climate change is strongly dependent on what the IPCC thinks about high-consequence outcomes. …”
19. Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh (2011) – Environment versus growth – A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth” – Ecological Economics 70:881–890 doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.09.035 – ICREA, Barcelona + Institute for Environmental Science and Technology, and Department of Economics and Economic History, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona + Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, and Institute for Environmental Studies
    “In recent debates on environmental problems and policies, the strategy of “degrowth” has appeared as an alternative to the paradigm of economic growth. This new notion is critically evaluated by considering five common interpretations of it. One conclusion is that these multiple interpretations make it an ambiguous and rather confusing concept. Another is that degrowth may not be an effective, let alone an efficient strategy to reduce environmental pressure. It is subsequently argued that “a-growth,” i.e. being indifferent about growth, is a more logical social aim to substitute for the current goal of economic growth, given that GDP (per capita) is a very imperfect indicator of social welfare. In addition, focusing ex ante on public policy is considered to be a strategy which ultimately is more likely to obtain the necessary democratic–political support than an ex ante, explicit degrowth strategy. In line with this, a policy package is proposed which consists of six elements, some of which relate to concerns raised by degrowth supporters.”
20. Conference Statement – Statement on Implications for Global Security – World Conference on the Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security, Toronto – 30/06/1988 – http://www.cmos.ca/ChangingAtmosphere1988e.pdf
    «The accelerating increase in concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, if continued, will probably result in a rise in the mean surface temperature of the Earth of 1.5 to 4.5 ºC before the middle of the next century … Global warming will accelerate the present sea-level rise. This will probably be of the order of 30 cm but could possibly be as much as 1.5 m by the middle of the century … Stabilizing the atmospheric concentrations of CO2 is an imperative goal. It is currently estimate to require reductions of more than 50% from the present emission levels … Reduce CO2 emissions by approximately 20% of 1988 levels by the year 2005 as an initial global goal.»
21. Andrew P. Schurer et al (2017) – Importance of the pre-industrial baseline for likelihood of exceeding Paris goals – Nature Climate Change 7:563–567 doi:10.1038/nclimate3345 – 24/07/2017 – School of GeoSciences, University of Edinburgh – http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/71780/1/schurer_etal_2017_NCC_accepted.pdf – 5 autores
    «However, ‘pre-industrial’ was not defined. Here we investigate the implications of different choices of the pre-industrial baseline on the likelihood of exceeding these two temperature thresholds. We find that for the strongest mitigation scenario RCP2.6 and a medium scenario RCP4.5, the probability of exceeding the thresholds and timing of exceedance is highly dependent on the pre-industrial baseline; for example, the probability of crossing 1.5 °C by the end of the century under RCP2.6 varies from 61% to 88% depending on how the baseline is defined. In contrast, in the scenario with no mitigation, RCP8.5, both thresholds will almost certainly be exceeded by the middle of the century with the definition of the pre-industrial baseline of less importance. Allowable carbon emissions for threshold stabilization are similarly highly dependent on the pre-industrial baseline. For stabilization at 2 °C, allowable emissions decrease by as much as 40% when earlier than nineteenth-century climates are considered as a baseline.»
22. Schurer et al (2018) – Interpretations of the Paris climate target – Nature Geoscience doi:10.1038/s41561-018-0086-8 – School of GeoSciences, University of Edinburgh
    “Crucially, in order for the temperature targets in the Paris Agreement to be as meaningful as possible, the amount of mitigation required to cap GMST needs to be linked to the impacts expected at that level of warming. It is here that ambiguity surrounding the definition of GMST is most problematic. For example, the impacts of 1.5 °C global warming on Australia were calculated with a GMST estimate based on SATs with complete coverage11, contrary to Millar and colleagues’ assumptions, and other impact studies also used different definitions12. We therefore recommend that a clear definition of GMST change is agreed, so that mitigation actions required to limit climate change impacts are assessed using self-consistent information. This would prevent apparently contradictory results due to differing interpretations.”
23. IPCC Working Group I (2013) – 5th Assessment Report The Physical Science Basis – Summary for Policymakers – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf
    “Projections in this Summary for Policymakers are for the end of the 21st century (2081–2100) given relative to 1986–2005, unless otherwise stated. To place such projections in historical context, it is necessary to consider observed changes between different periods. Based on the longest global surface temperature dataset available, the observed change between the average of the period 1850–1900 and of the AR5 reference period is 0.61 [0.55 to 0.67] °C. However, warming has occurred beyond the average of the AR5 reference period. Hence this is not an estimate of historical warming to present (see Chapter 2).”
24. Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case for Resilience – The World Bank, 01/11/2012 – http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Full_Report_Vol_2_Turn_Down_The_Heat_%20Climate_Extremes_Regional_Impacts_Case_for_Resilience_Print%20version_FINAL.pdf
    «While the global community has committed itself to holding warming below 2°C to prevent “dangerous” climate change, the sum total of current policies—in place and pledged—will very likely lead to warming far in excess of this level. Indeed, present emission trends put the world plausibly on a path toward 4°C warming within this century.»
25. Jeroen van der Sluijs et al (1998) – Anchoring devices in science for policy: the case of consensus around climate sensitivity – Social Studies of Science 28:291-323 doi:10.1177/030631298028002004 – Department of Science, Technology and Society, Utrecht University – – 4 authors
    “This paper adds a new dimension to the role of scientific knowledge in policy by emphasizing the multivalent character of scientific consensus. We show how the maintained consensus about … climate sensitivity operates as an `anchoring device’ in `science for policy’. In international assessments of the climate issue, the consensus-estimate of 1.5°C to 4.5°C for climate sensitivity has remained unchanged for two decades. Nevertheless, during these years climate scientific knowledge and analysis have changed dramatically. We identify several ways in which the scientists achieved flexibility in maintaining the same numbers for climate sensitivity while accommodating changing scientific ideas.”
26. Myles Allen et al (2018) – Global Warming of 1.5 °C. Summary for Policymakers – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – 06/10/2018 – – http://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf – 62 authors
    “D1.2. Overshoot trajectories result in higher impacts and associated challenges compared to pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (high confidence). Reversing warming after an overshoot of 0.2°C or larger during this century would require upscaling and deployment of CDR at rates and volumes that might not be achievable given considerable implementation challenges (medium confidence).
27. Heleen de Coninck and Aromar Revi (2018) – Global Warming of 1.5 °C. Chapter 4 – Strengthening and implementing the global response – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – http://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_chapter4.pdf
    “Limiting warming to 1.5°C would require transformative systemic change, integrated with sustainable development. Such change would require the upscaling and acceleration of the implementation of far-reaching, multi-level and cross-sectoral climate mitigation and addressing barriers. Such systemic change would need to be linked to complementary adaptation actions, including transformational adaptation, especially for pathways that temporarily overshoot 1.5°C ”
28. Céline Guivarch and Stéphane Hallegatte (2012) – 2C or not 2C? – Global Environmental Change 23:179–192 doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.10.006 – 08/11/2012 – Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le Développement; Ecole Nationale de la Météorologie, Météo-France
    “Life-cycle analyses demonstrate that in some situations the overall impact of biomass on GHG emissions can be potentially higher than the direct emissions of conventional fuels, depending on the use of fertilizers, the input of fossil fuels in the production, transport and conversion of biomass, as well as on how land use is affected by the biomass production (see Leemans et al., 1996; Searchinger et al., 2008; Fargione et al., 2008).”
29. Michael L. Szulczewski rt al (2012) – Lifetime of carbon capture and storage as a climate-change mitigation technology – Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences PNAS doi10.1073/pnas.1115347109 – Departments of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology – 4 authors
    «In carbon capture and storage (CCS), CO2 is captured at power plants and then injected underground into reservoirs like deep saline aquifers for long-term storage. While CCS may be critical for the continued use of fossil fuels in a carbon-constrained world, the deployment of CCS has been hindered by uncertainty in geologic storage capacities and sustainable injection rates, which has contributed to the absence of concerted government policy. Here, we clarify the potential of CCS to mitigate emissions in the United States by developing a storage-capacity supply curve that, unlike current large-scale capacity estimates, is derived from the fluid mechanics of CO2 injection and trapping and incorporates injection-rate constraints. We show that storage supply is a dynamic quantity that grows with the duration of CCS, and we interpret the lifetime of CCS as the time for which the storage supply curve exceeds the storage demand curve from CO2 production. We show that in the United States, if CO2 production from power generation continues to rise at recent rates, then CCS can store enough CO2 to stabilize emissions at current levels for at least 100 y. This result suggests that the large-scale implementation of CCS is a geologically viable climate-change mitigation option in the United States over the next century.»
30. Myles Allen et al (2018) – Global Warming of 1.5 °C. Summary for Policymakers – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – 06/10/2018 – – http://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf – 62 authors
    “D5.2. Adaptation finance consistent with global warming of 1.5°C is difficult to quantify and compare with 2°C. Knowledge gaps include insufficient data to calculate specific climate resilience-enhancing investments, from the provision of currently underinvested basic infrastructure. Estimates of the costs of adaptation might be lower at global warming of 1.5°C than for 2°C. Adaptation needs have typically been supported by public sector sources such as national and subnational government budgets, and in developing countries together with support from development assistance, multilateral development banks, and UNFCCC channels (medium confidence). More recently there is a growing understanding of the scale and increase in NGO and private funding in some regions (medium confidence). Barriers include the scale of adaptation financing, limited capacity and access to adaptation finance (medium confidence).”
31. Marina Garcés (2017) – Nova il·lustració radical – Editorial Anagrama – Universidad de Zaragoza; Espai en Blanc – ISBN-13: 978-8433916150 – 80 Págs.
    “La nostra època és la de la condició pòstuma: sobrevivim, els uns contra els altres, en un temps que només resta. Semblen paraules gastades i ingènues. Però precisament aquest és l’efecte desmobilitzador que el poder persegueix actualment: ridiculitzar la nostra capacitat d’educar-nos a nosaltres mateixos per construir, junts, un món més habitable i més just. Se’ns ofereixen tota mena de gadgets per a la salvació … se’ns embarca en projectes d’intel·ligència delegada un món smart per a uns habitants irremeiablement idiotes.” (p. 10)
32. Mikael Höök (2014) – Depletion of conventional hydrocarbons: recent perspectives on oil, gas and coal – II Congreso Internacional – Más allá del pico del petróleo: el futuro de la energía, Barbastro (Huesca) – Global Energy Systems, Department of Earth Sciences, Uppsala University – http://www.congresopicodepetroleo.unedbarbastro.es/ADJUNTO/presentacionesCongreso/2014/dia9/MikaelHookPresentacion.pdf
33. Myles Allen et al (2018) – Global Warming of 1.5 °C. Summary for Policymakers – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – 06/10/2018 – http://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf – 62 autores
    “B5.7. There are multiple lines of evidence that since the AR5 the assessed levels of risk increased for four of the five Reasons for Concern (RFCs) for global warming to 2°C (high confidence). The risk transitions by degrees of global warming are now: from high to very high between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC1 (Unique and threatened systems) (high confidence); from moderate to high risk between 1.0°C and 1.5°C for RFC2 (Extreme weather events) (medium confidence); from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC3 (Distribution of impacts) (high confidence); from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2.5°C for RFC4 (Global aggregate impacts) (medium confidence); and from moderate to high risk between 1°C and 2.5°C for RFC5 (Large-scale singular events) (medium confidence). (Figure SPM.2) {3.4.13; 3.5, 3.5.2} ”
34. David Spratt and Brian Dunlop (2018) – What Lies Beneath: The Understatement of Climate Existential Risk – National Center for Climate restoration – 01/08/2018 – Former chairman of the Australian Coal Association and chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company Directors – http://climateextremes.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/What-Lies-Beneath-V3-LR-Blank5b15d.pdf
    “Hans Joachim Schellnhüber: Climate change is now reaching the end-game, where very soon humanity must choose between taking unprecedented action, or accepting that it has been left too late and bear the consequences. Therefore, it is all the more important to listen to non-mainstream voices who do understand the issues and are less hesitant to cry wolf. Unfortunately for us, the wolf may already be in the house. ”
35. Mario Molina, Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Durwood J. Zaelke – Climate report understates threat – Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 09/10/2018 – https://thebulletin.org/2018/10/climate-report-understates-threat/
    “By largely ignoring such feedbacks, the IPCC report fails to adequately warn leaders about the cluster of six similar climate tipping points that could be crossed between today’s temperature and an increase to 1.5 degrees—let alone nearly another dozen tipping points between 1.5 and 2 degrees. These wildcards could very likely push the climate system beyond human ability to control. As the UN Secretary General reminded world leaders last month, “We face an existential threat. Climate change is moving faster than we are.… If we do not change course by 2020, we risk missing the point where we can avoid runaway climate change, with disastrous consequences….” The IPCC report makes clear for the first time that limiting warming to 1.5 degrees requires cutting short-lived super climate pollutions—black carbon, methane, and hydrofluorocarbons—along with carbon dioxide, as well as learning how to pull carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere at scale. ”
36. Will Steffen et al (2018) – Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene – Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences PNAS doi:10.1073/pnas.1810141115 – 06/08/2018 – Stockholm Resilience Centre – http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/early/2018/07/31/1810141115.full.pdf – 16 autores
    “A critical issue is that, if a planetary threshold is crossed toward the Hothouse Earth pathway, accessing the Stabilized Earth pathway would become very difficult no matter what actions human societies might take. … after the Earth System is committed to the Hothouse Earth pathway, the alternative Stabilized Earth pathway would very likely become inaccessible as illustrated in Fig. 2. ”
37. James Hansen (2013) – An Old Story, but Useful Lessons – Columbia University – 26/09/2013 –  http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2013/20130926_PTRSpaperDiscussion.pdf
    “Earth can «achieve» Venus-like conditions, in the sense of ~90 bar surface pressure, only after first getting rid of its ocean via escape of hydrogen to space. This is conceivable if the atmosphere warms enough that the troposphere expands into the present stratosphere, thus eliminating the tropopause (see Fig. 7 in our paper4 in press), causing water vapor to be transported more rapidly to the upper atmosphere, where it can be dissociated and the hydrogen can then escape to space. Thus extreme warming of the lower atmosphere with elimination of the cold-trap tropopause seems to be the essential physical process required for transition from Earth-like to Venus-like conditions.”
38. Rasmus Benestad and Ray Pierrehumbert – Lessons from Venus – Real Climate, 11/04/2006 – http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2006/04/lessons-from-venus/
    “The Earth may well succumb to a runaway greenhouse as the Sun continues to brighten over the next billion years or so, but the amount of CO2 we could add to the atmosphere by burning all available fossil fuel reserves would not move us significantly closer to the runaway greenhouse threshold. There are plenty of nightmares lurking in anthropogenic global warming, but the runaway greenhouse is not among them. The applicability to Venus of concepts originating in the study of Earth climate is a testament to the beauty and generality of the physical underpinnings of climate science.”